Speculations on NATO air operation in Kosovo in 1999, targeting the President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Slobodan Milosevic, appear periodically in Georgian media. For instance, on October 5, 2016, an interview of the Head of Mokhisi Saint George Church, Father Grigol Mezvrishvili was published on the website of Georgia and World:
“Orthodox Serbia was bombarded by NATO forces, until they made it kneel and took away Kosovo which is as historical for Serbia, as Abkhazia is for us.”
In order for a military intervention to be considered just, it should meet the following six principles: the intervention should have a just cause, a just motive, it should be the last resort, the interventionist should use proportional means, it should have reasonable chances of improving its conditions and an authorization from a respective body.
1. Just cause
Prior to the air operation:
- More than 2,000 people were victims of the policy of the Government of Serbia in 1998-1999;
- More than 250,000 Kosovar Albanians were evicted from their homes in summer 1998;
- According to the ruling of UNHCR, the ethnic cleansing had caused a refugee crisis by April 1999. Refugee inflow estimated at 226,000 in Albania, 125,000 in Macedonia and 33,000 in Montenegro. By May 1999, 580,000 people were left without homes particularly in Kosovo;
- By May 1999, 1.5 million people, which is 90% of Kosovo’s population, were forced out of their homes. 225,000 Kosovar Albanians are considered lost. At least 5,000 Kosovars were killed.
- There was a real expectation that if the situation on the Yugoslavian territory was left unanswered, it would get worse and Milosevic would commit genocide of Albanians.
2. Just motive
NATO intervention in Kosovo had three main goals:
Stop Milosevic’s violent policy against Kosovar Albanians; Significantly damage Belgrade’s military potential in order to stop the repression of Albanians; Avoiding humanitarian catastrophe in the central part of Europe and providing stability.
Opponents of the intervention speak of selectivity of NATO’s humanitarian intervention. In response to this, leaders of NATO state that the West does not have capacity to get engaged in every human rights violation case. Moreover, the fact that the international society failed to avoid such humanitarian catastrophes as in Rwanda and Srebrenica, would not serve as an argument for NATO’s intervention in Kosovo. The result of not engaging in Rwanda illustrates the reason why NATO had to make decision on intervening in Kosovo – to avoid the same result.
3. Intervention as the last resort
As a result of diplomatic pressure, the President of Yugoslavia made an agreement in October. The agreement was supervised by the Deputy State Secretary of the United States, Richard Holbrooke. The agreement between Holbrooke and Milosevic had to be approved by the OSCE which would be the only external supervisor that Milosevic allowed to enter Kosovo. OSCE formed an unarmed, civic Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) that started functioning in November 1998. A small NATO military unit headed by France was placed on the territory of neighboring FYROM in case the KVM needed to be evacuated.
The final negotiations began in July 1999. The contact group was offering autonomy to the Kosovar Albanians. The Albanians, considering several corrections, were supporting the draft version of the agreement. However, the Yugoslavian delegation rejected this agreement. The refusal of the Yugoslavian delegation worsened the situation in Kosovo. KVM left the territory and in a week’s time, NATO decided to start the air operation.
4. Proportional means
The principle of proportional means was met with the strategic bombing campaign of the allies, as it only implied bombing military installations deliberately. By the third day of the air operation, Yugoslavia’s all strategic military targets were destroyed. Nevertheless, the Yugoslavian Army was still attacking the KLA (Kosovo Liberation Army). NATO also bombed strategic facilities such as bridges, factories, governmental buildings. This is exactly why the opponents of the intervention are questioning the completion of proportional means principle by NATO. Mistakenly bombing Albanian refugees and the Embassy of China also caused criticism in the direction of NATO. The organization has apologized for both of the cases. These casualties were not predefined which is an important factor for determining the justness of the humanitarian intervention.
The opponents of the intervention also criticize the decision to implement the air operation and consider that a land operation would have caused less civil casualties. It is noteworthy that due to initial successes of the negotiations between Milosevic and the contact group, the NATO land forces were not mobilized and doing so would require several weeks that would be harmful for the Albanians.
5. Principle of reasonable chance
In Kosovo’s case, as a result of NATO’s intervention, Milosevic withdrew military forces from Kosovo and the air operation was stopped on June 10, 1999. Nearly ten years after the conflict, the international society has recognized the independence of Kosovo.
The criticizers of the intervention also note that the intervention of NATO worsened the situation, as Milosevic aggravated the ethnic cleansing exactly as a response to the intervention. Persecution of Albanians was a part of Milosevic’s general policy and in case of not intervening, genocide of Kosovar Albanians would have been inevitable. It is noteworthy that the number of Jewish casualties increased significantly after the allies announced war against Hitler, however, nobody questioned the war against the dictator then. The intervention in Kosovo had positive results, as the Kosovar population became free after years of oppression.
6. Authorization from a respective body
NATO began the air operation in Kosovo without a mandate from the United Nations. In this regard, theoreticians argue whether the United Nations’ Security Council is a democratic institute and to what extent has the international society the right to neglect the Security Council’s refusal and implement an intervention in case of a humanitarian catastrophe.
NATO’s intervention in Kosovo paved way to a new principle – Responsibility to Protect – which means that the international society not only has right to prevent crimes against humanity, but is obliged to do so.
