{"id":75628,"date":"2021-11-08T14:53:21","date_gmt":"2021-11-08T10:53:21","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/mythdetector.ge\/?p=75628"},"modified":"2022-01-28T15:25:27","modified_gmt":"2022-01-28T11:25:27","slug":"pre-election-monitoring-of-disinformation-and-coordinated-inauthentic-behavior","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/mythdetector.ge\/en\/pre-election-monitoring-of-disinformation-and-coordinated-inauthentic-behavior\/","title":{"rendered":"Pre-Election Monitoring of Disinformation and Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior"},"content":{"rendered":"
On October 2nd<\/sup>, 2021, Georgia held the local self-government elections, while on October 30th<\/sup>, the second round of mayoral elections was held in 5 self-governing cities and 15 municipalities. “Myth Detector” identified the following types of election-related violations during the pre-election period from July 31st<\/sup>\u00a0to November 3rd<\/sup>:<\/p>\n Main Findings:<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n The following tendencies emerged during the monitoring period (July 31st\u00a0<\/sup>\u2013 November 3rd<\/sup>):<\/p>\n Methodology<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n The selection of monitoring subjects was carried out through the Facebook analytical tool CrowdTangle, amounting to up to 300 Facebook pages and groups. Within the third-party fact-checking program framework, Myth Detector had access to viral, reported posts from Georgia on Facebook. Fact-checking, as well as identifying unauthorized accounts and coordinated inauthentic behaviour, is based on the Myth Detector\u00a0methodology<\/a>, developed according to the best international experience in OSINT research. In the process of research and fact-checking, \u201cMyth Detector\u201d follows the standards set by the IFCN Editorial\u00a0Code<\/a>\u00a0of Conduct.<\/p>\n Disinformation and other manipulative content<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n During the monitoring period (July 31st<\/sup>\u00a0 – November 3rd<\/sup>), “Myth Detector” identified 53 cases of disinformation and manipulation, of which 22 took place before the first round of elections and directly on the election day, while the remaining 31 from October 3rd<\/sup>\u00a0to November 3rd<\/sup>.<\/p>\n The disinformation cases primarily targeted election subjects and political leaders, observers and research organizations. Most of the disinformation revealed during the monitoring was directed against the United National Movement, the most significant part of which was related to the arrival and arrest of Saakashvili, the leader of the UNM:<\/p>\n During the election monitoring, \u201cMyth Detector\u201d identified several types of violations, the most common of which was the spread of disinformation and fabricated quotes:<\/p>\n 1.1. Disinformation<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n United National Movement.<\/strong>\u00a0The most significant share of disinformation was directed against the UNM and its leader, the former president of Georgia, Mikheil Saakashvili. Regarding the latter, most of the materials concerned his arrival to Georgia, his arrest, and his personal life. In addition, a large part of the disinformation spread allegations about the internal party split and Nika Melia leaving the party:<\/p>\n \u00a0Disinformation: Saakashvili Arrested<\/a>\u00a0at the Turkish Consulate<\/p>\n<\/li>\n Georgian Dream.<\/strong>\u00a0When it comes to the disinformation directed against the incumbent party, both cases were about the leaders of the GD leaving the country:<\/p>\n For Georgia.<\/strong>\u00a0\u00a0In both cases, the disinformation against the party was linked to its leader, Giorgi Gakharia. In one case, the misinformation was linked to false election promises, in another to allegations of drug addiction, and in this context to President Salome Zurabishvili:<\/p>\n Noteworthy, in the latter case, the false information was disseminated in the name of the pro-governmental TV Company Imedi. Fabrication of information on behalf of the media was most often in the form of fabricated quotes, examples of which are discussed in more detail in the following section.<\/p>\n Against ANOVA and Mtavari Arkhi.<\/strong>\u00a0After \u201cMtavari Arkhi\u201d terminated the contract with Ipsos to conduct the election exit polls and contracted with the local research company ANOVA to acquire the above-mentioned function in the second round of the elections, the widespread disinformation tried to accentuate ANOVA\u2019s lack of experience, underscoring its unreliability:<\/p>\n 1.2. Fabricated Quotes<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n Election monitoring revealed 14 cases where fabricated quotes were spread in the name of politicians and their family members.<\/p>\n United National Movement.<\/strong>\u00a0Most of the fabricated quotes (10) were disseminated in the name of the United National Movement and its supporters. The vast majority of the quotes were ascribed to Mikheil Saakashvili, focusing on the internal conflict of the UNM party:<\/p>\n Facebook Page Spreading Fabricated Quote<\/a>\u00a0in the Name of a UNM Member<\/p>\n<\/li>\n Fabricated Quote of a UNM Member<\/a>\u00a0Disseminated in the Name of Georgian Public Broadcaster<\/p>\n<\/li>\n A Fabricated Quote Disseminated<\/a>\u00a0in the Name of Mikheil Saakashvili\u2019s Son<\/p>\n<\/li>\n Third Force<\/strong>. Two instances of fabricated quotes against the leaders of the \u201cThird Force\u2019 – Giorgi and Grigol Vashadze – concerned the vulnerable groups, namely the LGBTQ community. The quotes attempted to connect these politicians with unpopular topics during the election run-ups:<\/p>\n Fabricated Quote in the Name of the CEC.<\/strong>\u00a0On September 26th<\/sup>, a fake page was created on behalf of the CEC, which published one disinformation about Zviad Kuprava, UNM affiliate:<\/p>\n\n
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