Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Grigory Karasin said in the interview with RFE/RL on May 24, following the meeting in the Abashidze-Karasin format that Russia has completely fulfilled its commitments under the August 12, 2008 six-point ceasefire agreement. The EU-mediated ceasefire agreement was signed by the Georgian and Russian Presidents to end the August hostilities in Georgia. One of its points envisages the withdrawal of Russian troops to pre-conflict positions.
Five of six points of the August 12, 2008 ceasefire agreement, which were directly related to the Russian Federation, have not been fulfilled so far. Moreover, instead of rejecting violence and hostilities, since August 2008 Russia still continues creeping occupation, as well as the practice of kidnapping, detaining and killing of people from the occupied and adjacent territories.
What does the August 12, 2008 six-point ceasefire agreement envisage?
Following Russia’s aggression against Georgia, on August 12, 2008 the EU-brokered six-point ceasefire agreement was developed with direct involvement of then French President Nicola Sarkozy, whose country held the EU presidency. The Russian side signed the agreement on August 16. The 4th point of the six-point agreement says that Georgian military forces must withdraw to the places they are usually stationed. Georgia has fulfilled this point. Not only had the Georgian troops returned to the places of their dislocation following the August war, but Georgia lost its territories due to Russia’s non-fulfillment of its commitments under the agreement. As for the fulfillment of commitments undertaken by Russia, the table below provides an incomplete list of the data proving that the Russian Federation has not fulfilled even one commitment under the agreement.
|Points||August 12, 2008 Ceasefire Agreement||Fulfillment||Real Facts|
|1||Non-use of force||X||The Russian Federation refuses to fulfill the non-use of force commitment.
Since signing the August 12, 2008 agreement, the Russian occupation forces and puppet governments have:
Along with intensification of the so called borderization process in 2011, 32 more villages, as well as a 1600-meter section of the Baku-Supsa oil pipeline fell beyond the occupation line. The Russian occupation forces have installed over 52 kilometers of barriers and barbed wire along the administrative boundary line.
|2||A definitive halt to hostilities||X||Actions carried out by the Russian occupation forces and puppet governments against Georgian citizens
The facts of violation of Georgia’s territorial integrity and sovereignty by the Russian occupation forces since August 12, 2008
Illegal Integration of Georgia’s Abkhazia and Tskhinvali Regions into Russia’s military and political system
Militarization of Georgia’s occupied Abkhazia and Tskhinvali regions and illegal military exercises:
|3||Provision of free access for humanitarian assistance||X||Russia blocks access to international human rights mechanisms in the occupied regions:
In addition, the situation is aggravating in the occupied regions on a daily basis. Russia intensifies ethnic discrimination against Georgian citizens living in Abkhazia and Tskhinvali Region, including through restricting Georgian language instruction in the schools of Gali district and registering local Georgian population as foreigners.
|5||The Russian armed forces should withdraw to positions prior to the outbreak of hostilities
While waiting for an international mechanism, Russian peacekeeping forces will implement additional security measures
|The Russian armed forces still stay on the territory, which until August 6, 2008 (before the launch of hostilities) was controlled by Georgia’s central government.
According to Point 5 of the agreement, Russian occupation forces should withdraw from Akhalgori district and Upper Abkhazia, where they still stay, because these territories had never been parts of the conflict zone (neither in the nineties nor in a period before the August war) and they were illegally occupied after signing the August 2008 ceasefire agreement.
Number of Russian military units deployed on the territory of Georgia significantly exceeds the limits envisaged by the ceasefire agreement.
According to available data, over 10 000 servicemen are deployed in Abkhazia and Tskhinvali Region. Before the launch of hostilities, Russia should not have had its troops either in Tskhinvali Region or in Abkhazia. Only a 500-strength peacekeeping battalion (plus a 300-strength reserve force) should have been deployed in Tskhinvali Region, and a 2 500 – 3 000-strength CIS peacekeeping unit – in Abkhazia.
Russia blocked creation of all types of international mechanisms. It did not give EUMM access to the occupied regions, though the latter’s jurisdiction covers entire Georgia.
Communique of the President of France reads that “additional security measures” will take the form of patrols rather than of permanent checkpoints. Despite it, the Russian Federation set up permanent checkpoints and deployed its troops on the territory of Georgia.
|6||Opening of international discussions on security and stability modalities in Abkhazia and South Ossetia||X||The format of Geneva International Discussions (GID) was launched to address security and humanitarian consequences of the Russian-Georgian war of August 2008.
The Russian President hampered constructive discussions on stability and security in Abkhazia and Tskhinvali Region through unilateral recognition of the independence of these regions.