Brīvības un Solidaritātes Fonds released the publication “Resisting Foreign State Propaganda in the New Information Environment: the case of the EU, Russia, and the Eastern Partnership countries”. The book collects expert opinions regarding policy responses against Russian propaganda efforts both at EU level and within EaP countries (Georgia, Ukraine, Moldova), provides in-depth analysis of current challenges and proposes relevant recommendations.
The full publication is available at: http://bit.ly/2cTGQr5
The publication is the part of the project organized by the Foundation for European Progressive Studies (FEPS) with the support of Brīvības un Solidaritātes Fonds (BSF).
The article “Further from ‘Russkiy Mir’, closer to the West” by Tamar Kintsurashvili, the Chair of the Board of Media Development Foundation (MDF) was included in this publication and is presented below:
FURTHER FROM ‘RUSSKIY MIR’, CLOSER TO THE WEST
Democracy is the only thing I like about the West’, said a young man during an emotional discussion on Russian propaganda in the town of Dmanisi in one of the regions of Georgia where the first Europeans originated. What he and his likeminded Georgian friends dislike about the Western world is that democracy provides free space for people with different beliefs and identities.
In post-Soviet countries fear is being sown that the price of integration into the European family will be the loss of national, religious, and sexual identity; the premise being that action should be taken to defend the notion of ‘honour’. This popular narrative, stemming from the concept of ‘Russkiy mir’,1 is the most powerful[1]message defining values-based discourse in the Georgian media landscape. Unlike in other Eastern European countries, Russian propaganda in Georgia is of a complex nature. Alongside Russian propaganda platforms, some Georgian-language media outlets incite hatred towards ethnic and religious minorities, and LGBT groups; these media platforms are a major source of anti-Western sentiment.
This paper describes the recent trends showing a decline in support for Euro-Atlantic integration and an increase in access to Russian-language media outlets over the past few years; it then provides an overview of the major communication channels, key messages, and propaganda tools used by Georgian-language media when directly referring to Russian sources or presenting Russian narratives in an ethno-nationalistic context.
A public opinion survey commissioned by the National Democratic Institute (NDI) in August 2015, showed a drop of 17 points from 78% in support for EU integration since August 2014.[2]However, the most recent NDI survey from April 2016 indicates popular support for integration rebounding to 77%. At the same time, support in favour of NATO integration has declined by 12% compared to 2013 when 80% of the population was in favour. These sharp fluctuations in public attitudes over short periods of time indicate the fragility of the situation and the persistence of Russian soft power in Georgia.
Although Russian media sources are neither popular nor widespread in Georgia, an increase in access to previously limited Russian-language media platforms has been observed in recent years. According to an NDI opinion poll from April 2015, respondents stated that TV channels are the major source of information about Georgian politics and current affairs for 87% of respondents, and only 20% watch news coverage and current affairs on foreign channels.[3]Among the 20% of Georgians who rely on foreign sources, Russian Channel One (38%), RTR (30%), Russia 1 (18%), and REN TV (16%) dominate over English-language and other networks. The language barrier in the regions densely populated by ethnic Armenians (Samtskhe-Javaketi) and Azeri (Kvemo Kartly) leaves no option for local populations to integrate into the Georgian information space, thus making a significant percentage of Georgian citizens fully dependent on foreign media sources. The information vacuum in these regions is manifested in public attitudes, which have been more constant among minorities during the last years. A survey by the Eurasia Foundation from November 2015 shows that Georgia’s membership in the EU is not greatly favoured by ethnic minorities—only 35% would vote for membership, opposed to 9% who would not.[4]
Political changes in the country that led to the first democratic transfer of power have also impacted the media landscape in Georgia. International organizations observed an improved level of media plurality after the 2012 parliamentary elections; this improvement brought a variety of platforms, including the return of Russian-language channels. After the conflict between Russia and Georgia in August 2008, cable TV operators terminated the broadcast of federally owned Russian TV channels in the country. This decision was presented as voluntary, without an order from the government, and was not enforced by an official legal act. However, the return of Russian TV channels after the 2012 parliamentary elections indicates that the initial decision was not far from being political interference. The Georgian Public Broadcaster, owned by the Georgian authorities, launched the Georgian-language TV channel Perviy Informatsionniy Kavkazsky (PIK) or the First Caucasus News in January 2010; it was intended to counter pro-Moscow reporting, but was also closed down after the 2012 parliamentary elections. The Russian-language PIK channel was broadcast throughout the Caucasus and the European part of Russia, becoming a popular Russian-language alternative to Russian propaganda platforms. In a setting where EU member countries are discussing the possibility of creating a common Russian-language channel, reopening PIK might be an effective measure in countering Russian propaganda and meeting the demands of viewers who depend on Russian-language sources or habitually watch such media.
While the impact of the Russian media is more explicit and visible in minority-populated areas, the picture in other parts of the country is blurred and fragmented. Russia’s propaganda network involves Russian-language platforms and Georgian tabloid media, but also political parties, orthodox clergy, NGOs, and the so-called intelligentsia or Soviet elite, who still largely shape public opinion.
Sources of Anti-Western propaganda
Georgian Language Media. The Pro-Kremlin channel Sputnik-Georgia, which operates as an online platform in the local language, is less popular in Georgia than other ethno-nationalistic media outlets pursuing the same goals.[5]Even those politicians who openly support pro-Kremlin politics shun being publicly labelled as pro-Russian and claim that their agenda is pro-Georgian. The same ethno-nationalistic concept—neither Russian nor Western—is fundamental in mobilizing Georgians against anti-Western causes via media platforms. Patriotic language is a major tool used to appeal to people’s national pride. Flagrant Russian propaganda is less common than denouncing the West.
Marked anti-Western attitudes and pro-Russian narratives can be found on the TV channel Obiektivi,[6]which is linked to the pro-Russian political party Alliance of Patriots, and in several tabloid newspapers—Asaval-Dasavali, Alia, and Kviris Chronika. According to the report on Georgia carried out by the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI), the editorial policies of all of the above-mentioned media outlets are either xenophobic or homophobic.[7]ECRI also criticized the Georgian government for providing service contracts for these media outlets since they incite hate speech, which is against the spirit of anti-discriminative policies and ECRI regulations.
An attempt on the part of the Georgian government to bring a number of anti-Western and xenophobic tabloids into the mainstream and legitimize them is another problem manifested through financial relationships and the public statements of high political figures speaking in their favour. For instance, while still in office, former Prime Minister Bidzina Ivanishvili repeatedly praised Asaval-Dasavali as a ‘patriotic’ publication; Asaval-Dasavali is a newspaper with a distinctly homophobic and xenophobic editorial policy.[8]In addition to the ethno-nationalistic media platforms, a study by the Media Development Foundation (MDF) found several online media outlets that have declared their pro-Russian editorial policies, namely saqinform. ge and geworld.ge.[9]Saqinform.ge engages in the fabrication of information based on Russian media sources (i.e. Regnum, RT, warfiles.ru, nakanune.ru, Rossiyskaya Gazeta, and others).[10]The news agency is known for its xenophobic and homophobic content, similar to that of geworld.ge, which was founded by the pro-Russian NGO Historical Heritage.
Lack of transparency in funding is another key challenge characteristic of the Georgian media landscape. Despite a scarcity of financial resources in the media market, numerous new online and TV platforms with anti-Western editorial policies have emerged during past few years. In the recent study ‘Who owns Georgia’s media’, Transparency International Georgia draws attention to the ownership of several cable and Internet outlets by anti-Western and religious organizations.[11]‘Their declared revenue is rather small, making it unclear what resources these channels have been using to be able to broadcast’, the report says.
Mixed messages from Georgian Dream. Though the current Georgian government has declared its goal to join NATO and the EU, individual members of the ruling coalition, Georgian Dream (GD), give mixed messages about the country’s pro-Western orientation, creating ambiguity among citizens. According to a survey conducted among youth by the Media Development Foundation (MDF), only 10.6% of respondents regard messages from various branches of power regarding Euro-Atlantic integration as consistent, whereas 40.2% believe that these messages are conflicting and that various government representatives make contradictory statements.[12]
The messages by individual members of the ruling coalition concern different topics and fully coincide with the rhetoric of radical extremist pro-Russian political groups and anti-Western media outlets:
- North-Atlantic Integration: ‘We need neither NATO, nor the EU.’ (Gogi Topadze, MP, Georgian Dream-Entrepreneurs)[13]
- NATO = a threat of losing territorial integrity: ‘If the close cooperation with any political or military alliance damages the interests or territorial integrity of our country, I will say no to this cooperation without hesitation.’ (Tamaz Mechiauri, MP, Georgian Dream)[14]
- EU/NATO = pederasty: ‘If pederasty is needed for Georgia to join the EU and NATO, then I, Dima Jaiani, will never want to join NATO.’ (Dima Jaiani, Minister of Education and Culture of Abkhazia in exile)[15]
- The West cannot protect us against threat: ‘Russia is our eternal neighbour… We only got worries, water, and diapers from the West.’ [during the 2008 Russo-Georgian War] (Zaza Papuashvili, MP, Georgian Dream)[16]
- Russia and the Eurasian Union is an alternative to the West: ‘NATO is an aggressive military block… the Eurasian Union is the opportunity of being much better.’ (Gogi Topadze, MP, Georgian Dream-Entrepreneurs);[17]‘We should take steps to talk with Russia without mediators, we have no other option.’ (Soso Jachvliani, MP, Georgian Dream)[18]
- Primacy of economic relations with Russia: ‘Why should we throw away everything that has been achieved over the last three years while the Europeans do everything they can to return to the Russian market? It is going to be much more difficult to sell our products on the European market. It is not as easy as it seems to be—they have excess [agricultural] production and do not know where to put their own [products].’ (Zurab Chekurishvili, Advisor to the Minister of Agriculture of Georgia)[19]
- EU imposes reforms: ‘Frankly speaking, my hand was trembling when we were adopting the law. But we also have to compromise sometimes in order to save the country, to save it from “Ukrainization”.’ (Omar Nishnianidze, MP, Georgian Dream)[20]
- Events in Ukraine inspired by US: ‘There are great interests there [in Ukraine] of Russia, also Europe and America…When you go there and clearly take sides, it indicates that you are not right… [I mean] that American diplomats [Victoria Nuland] who go there and give out sweet loaves and something. If someone supports me in such a way, I will overthrow any government.’ (Soso Jachvliani, MP, Georgian Dream)[21]
- EU forces to surrender traditions: ‘We have signed the Association Agreement [with the EU], but we do not see what the EU is doing, what it imposes on us. We ourselves have yielded many things that do not suit Georgian traditions. For instance LGBT issues, genetically modified food. It was forbidden there, but we are exporting it.’ (Gogi Topadze, MP, Georgian Dream-Entrepreneurs)[22]
- Foreign funded NGOs should be forbidden: ‘Many countries have banned NGOs, blocked their bank accounts, where they receive funding from abroad. When you shake the ground off of your own state, your country, because you receive grants from abroad, you should be held responsible for that, of course. This needs to be forbidden, this is how Americans have overthrown [the governments of] many countries, this is how tragedies happened in Arab countries, in Iraq, Yugoslavia, Libya, Egypt, and now in Syria we witness the same, and they are destroying this country under the pretext of establishing democracy.’ (Gogi Topadze, MP, Georgian Dream-Entrepreneurs)[23]
Other members of the ruling coalition portray NGOs as betraying Georgian national interests and the Orthodox Church. Similarities can be found with Russia’s newly updated Security Concept for 2015 where ‘colour revolutions’ and NGOs are listed among the key threats to Russia’s security.[24]
Pro-Kremlin political parties. According to the MDF’s media monitoring, the political parties most frequently expressing anti-Western attitudes are Nino Burjanadze’s Democratic Movement (DM) and the parties that set up the election bloc with her party for the 2014 local elections, as well as Public Assembly, a movement affiliated with DM, and the Alliance of Patriots.[25]
Alliance of Patriots, which employs its own media platform, the media-union Obiektivi, received seats (5.37%) in the self-government bodies in the local elections for the first time ever in 2014. The political party gained support through mobilizing the electorate with its homophobic attitudes and Turkophobic and Islamophobic statements, and leveraging Turkophobia in an anti-Western context. The message ‘If Russia is an occupier, why isn’t Turkey seen the same way?’ refers to the historical occupation of Georgian territory by the Ottoman Empire. In the modern context, Georgia’s integration into NATO is considered a direct threat of a Turkish invasion into the country’s Samtske-Javaketi region, which is densely populated by Armenian minorities. This message found fertile ground among the population in that region. Euro-Atlantic integration is seen as a threat; the key messages delivered by Burjanadze’s Democratic Movement and the affiliated Public Assembly concerned the prospect of losing territorial integrity and an attempt by the West to impose incest.[26]The Freedom House report Nations in Transition 2016 states that ‘Pro-Russian political parties in Georgia are widely seen as being funded by Moscow and part of Russia’s efforts to extend its influence over Georgia and destabilize the country’.[27]Lack of transparency in political party financing, as well as the financing of other pro-Kremlin channels (the media, NGOs), is one of the challenges facing the country. Despite legal restrictions to receiving donations from abroad, political actors find covert ways to avoid direct identifying their foreign financial sources. This problem is has intensified ahead of the 2016 parliamentary elections; some observers do not discount the possibility of changes to the foreign orientation of the country resulting from election outcomes.[28]
The Orthodox clergy. Another source of anti-Western sentiments is the Georgian Orthodox Church; prominent figures regularly preach about the harm done by Western civilization to the Georgian Orthodox identity and make similar public statements in the media. The Orthodox Church remains the most trusted institution in the country and still maintains ties with Moscow. The Church’s ambiguous position towards Russia was expressed in the Georgian-language Church magazine in 2008. The magazine wrote that the Russians bombing Georgia during the Russo-Georgian War in August 2008 were carrying out ‘God’s punishment’, and ‘God thus prevented Georgia from getting too close to Western countries and gave His blessing to coming under Russia’s protection.[29]
Pro-Kremlin NGOs. Multiple pro-Kremlin organizations have emerged in the past few years, campaigning in favour of Georgia’s integration into the Eurasian Union. With the exception of two key actors, the Eurasian Institute and Eurasian Choice, numerous interlinked organizations and media platforms operate in a non-transparent manner.
Intelligentsia. The intelligentsia or the so-called Soviet elite, comprising well-known writers, actors, and other privileged members of society, continues to influence public opinion. This group of disseminators is mainly involved in value-based judgments about the honour of the nation and alien values imposed from the Western world.
Key messages and propaganda tools
Messages. Key messages disseminated by the above-mentioned actors can be grouped into three major categories—topics related tovalues and human rights; policy issues related to Georgia’s integration into the Western community and foreign affairs; and issues related to non-governmental institutions and international organizations.
Value-based judgments are mainly focused on the following topics:
- The West is against the Georgian Orthodox Church. This type of message is intended to emphasize the spiritual unity of the orthodox world and the special role of Russia in defending orthodoxy from aliens. At certain times such messages are showcased as opposition to orthodox Russia.
- The West seeks to undermine Georgian national identity, traditions, culture, religion, and values.
- The West imposes homosexuality, paedophilia, incest, and a perverse mode of life. Issues of gender and sexual identity are portrayed as an attack on family values and traditions.
- The idea of ‘minority rights’ is code for Western-inspired separatism. Topics such as the ratification of Council of Europe’s charter for regional or minority languages and the repatriation of Georgian citizens deported from the Meskheti region during Stalin’s regime were discussed in relation to the Association agreement.
Messages concerning international cooperation and foreign political processes mainly revolve around the following themes:
- The Association Agreement with the EU is interpreted as a tool for the subjugation of Georgia and the destruction of its economy.
- Georgia will not benefit from the Association Agreement and the only way for the Georgian economy to survive is by joining the Russian market.
- The US and the West in general are offenders and strategically encourage coups in various countries to benefit the West.
- Events in Ukraine are portrayed as actions undertaken by the west against Russia.
- Euro-Atlantic integration is associated with the expansion of Turkey and the loss of Georgian territories.
- Messages conveying the opinion that ‘NATO and the EU are not the choice of Georgian people’ question the legitimacy of the plebiscite conducted in 2008 in support of NATO integration and show that public opinion polls in favour of EU integration lacked legitimization on the part of people.
- Russia is portrayed as a counterweight to the West.
- The Richard G. Lugar Center for Public Health Research, which is part of the Georgian National Center for Disease Control and Public Health, is portrayed by Russian sources as a threat aimed to destroy Georgian genes.
The third group was dominated by two types of messages concerning institutions supporting open society, namely, non-governmental organizations, which were portrayed as the hired spies of foreign counties, while international organizations were portrayed as branches of special services. The founder of the Open Society Georgia Foundation, George Soros, is commonly portrayed as attacking Georgian identity, and is the most demonized public person in this context.
Propaganda tools.The most popular propaganda tool used by a number of sources is the FALSE DILEMMA or ‘black-and-white thinking’ technique in which only two choices are presenting and one is clearly the better option. Examples of this approach is predominantly expressed through the following formulas:
- If the West stands for a perverted lifestyle and the legalization of homosexuality, we do not need the West!
- If the West imposes homosexuality, the Georgian people prefer Russia to the West!
- If integration into NATO is tantamount to the loss of territorial integrity, we do not need NATO.
- Hussein, Kaddafi, and Assad were no angels, but they did not kill people. After the US arrived, many people who lived peacefully in the Middle East were killed.
The AD NAUSEUM approach, or the tireless repetition of an idea until people begin to take it as the truth, is another technique used to propagate a number of similar messages, or even messages with identical wording:
- ‘The West cannot protect us against threats.’ was also stated as ‘The US and Western countries only assisted us with water and diapers during 2008 Russo-Georgian war.’
- ‘Events in Ukraine are inspired by the US.’ was also stated as ‘Victoria Nuland was distributing sweet loaves to the opposition in the centre of Kiev in 2013 during the Maidan protest.’
DEMONIZATION is a technique that is widely used to portray opponents as inhumane beings through false accusations and unjustified generalization. The most commonly encountered instances combined the demonization of the US and the EU with the fabrication of information in an attempt to create an artificial reality.
FABRICATED INFORMATION in relation to Ukraine was mainly based on Russian media sources. In some cases Georgian media outlets either literally repeat or very much resemble the pattern of reporting on domestic political events of Georgia set by Russian media sources:
- Georgian website sakinform.ge published news concerning the construction of an EU concentration camp in Ukraine. The Russian source of this fabricated information was politikus.ru.
- Georgian website sakinform. geandambebi.ge, as well as the newspaper Asaval-dasavali published news concerning the trade in human organs in Ukraine and Georgia. The Ukrainian Russian source of this fabricated information was slovo.net.ua.
- Georgian website sakinform.ge published news concerning black US instructors arriving in Ukraine as mercenaries. The Russian source of this fabricated information was warfiles.ru.
- Georgian websitesakinform.gepublished news concerning the import of US-manufactured bacteriological weapons to Ukraine. The Russian source of this fabricated information was the news portal REGNUM.
Response to Anti-Western Propaganda Although the openness, transparency, and insistence on allowing multiple voices to be heard that are the hallmarks of democracy allow Russia to misuse democratic institutions, such as the media, restricting propaganda platforms is not a solution. What targeted countries can do is prevent the penetration of Russian funds by introducing efficient transparency rules and responding to instances of money laundering within the legal framework.
Efforts to undermine pro-Western public opinion in Georgia have been considerably stepped up during last several years and may well become even more damaging during the pre-election period. The temptation to win over voters with emotional appeals to save the nation from loss of identity is strong, even among representatives of the ruling coalition. According to a recent NDI survey, support for the coalition (15%) dropped significantly over the last year. Inconsistent and mixed messages from individual members of the ruling Georgian Dream coalition, both in parliament and government, play a negative role in burgeoning Western-sceptic attitudes. It is crucial for the Georgian government to maintain clear and consistent messages with a unified approach regarding the Westernization agenda and advancing Georgia towards the West. The government’s communication strategy should be focused on delivering messages about the practical benefits of EU integration along with rapid response mechanisms to minimise the spread of disinformation.
Greater efforts should be undertaken by media watchdog organizations to track the flow of disinformation and to develop reactive response mechanisms that can challenge factual errors, while taking a proactive approach towards the misrepresentation of Western values in local contexts.
A shortage of research and human resources in media newsrooms and, in some cases, the poor qualifications of journalists should be addressed, not only by shortterm training programmes, but through permanent cooperation between the media, think tanks, and watchdog groups so that they are better able to make a use of their accumulated experience, expertise, and findings. Local and international donor organizations should support this type cooperation to ensure that project activities reach their target groups in the most effective manner possible. In this regard, special emphasis should be placed on those media outlets that reach larger audiences and have a stronger influence on society.
One final, but no less important factor to be taken into consideration is the significance of religion in post-Soviet communities. Since the concept of Russkiy Mir relies on the effectiveness of Moscow’s mechanisms for disseminating messages via the Russian Orthodox Church worldwide, the role of the clergy in anti-Western discourse should not be overlooked. In addition to improving mechanisms for responding to disinformation, e.g. quickly dispelling such rumour as ‘the ECHR has placed a ban on the baptism of new born children’, teaching critical thinking in schools is essential, even though it is a long-term project.[30]Distancing Georgia from Russkiy Mir and its integration into the Western community must be based on shared values and attitudes and can be influenced by public diplomacy efforts.
[1]Nicolai N. Petro, Russia’s Orthodox Soft Power, Carnegie Council, 2015,https://www.carnegiecouncil.org/publications/articles_papers_reports/727
[2]2 Laura Thornton and Koba Trumanidze, Public Attitudes in Georgia, National Democratic Institute, August 2015, pg. ??, https://www.ndi.org/ files/NDI_August_2015_Survey_public%20Political_ENG_vf.pdf
[4]Knowledge and Attitudes towards EU in Georgia: Trends and Variations 2009-2015, Eurasia Partnership Foundation, 2015, http://www.epfound. ge/files/eu_attitudes_survey_eng_nov_24_1.pdf
[5]Media Profiles: Sputnik-Georgia, MediaMeter web portal supported by the Media Development Foundation, 2016,http://mediameter.ge/en/media-profiles/sputnik-georgia
[6]Media Profiles: Obiektivi, MediaMeter, MediaMeter web portal supported by the Media Development Foundation, 2016, http://mediameter.ge/ en/media-profiles/obiektivi
[7]ECRI report on Georgia (fifth monitoring cycle), European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, 2016, http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/ecri/Country-by-country/Georgia/GEO-CbC-V-2016-002-ENG.pdf
[8]Interview with Bidzina Ivanishvili, Asaval-Dasavali 06.02.2012
[9]Tamar Kintsurashvili, Anti-Western Propaganda Media Monitoring Report, Media Development Foundation, 2015, http://mdfgeorgia.ge/uploads/library/15/file/eng/Antidasavluri-ENG-web.pdf
[10]Media Profiles: Sakinformi, MediaMeter, MediaMeter web portal supported by the Media Development Foundation, 2016, http://mediameter. ge/en/media-profiles/sakinformi
[11]Who owns Georgia’s media, Transparency International Georgia, 2015, http://www.transparency.ge/sites/default/files/post_attachments/who_ owns_georgias_media.pdf
[12]Youth Attitudes towards European Integration, Media Development Foundation, 2015, http://mdfgeorgia.ge/uploads/library/27/file/eng/Research-Publication-ENG.pdf
[13]Geworld.ge, 12 March 2015. http://bit.ly/1MGN0ql
[14]Tamaz Mechiauri does not rule out the rejection from NATO Rustavi 2 station, Kurieiri news program, 8 April 2016. http://rustavi2.com/en/ news/43848
[15]Prime Time newspaper, 31 March 2014
[16]Geworld.ge, 25 March 2015
[17]Kviris Palitra newspaper, 19 March 2015
[18]IPN, 22 July 2015.
[19]Myth Detector: Representative of the Ministry of Agriculture in Georgia Made False Statements Regarding the EU Market in an Interview with Sputnik-Georgia, Euro Communicator, Media Development Foundation and US Aid, 2016, http://eurocommunicator.ge/eng/view_myth/301
[20]Geworld.ge, 4 June 2014
[21]Prime Time, 24 February 2014
[22]IPN, 1 July 2015
[23]Geworld.ge, 6 March 2015 182 183
[24]Стратегия национальной безопасности Российской Федерации, #683, 31 декабря 2015, http://kremlin.ru/acts/bank/40391/page/1
[25]Anti-Western Attitudes in Georgian Media, Media Development Foundation, 2015, http://mdfgeorgia.ge/uploads/library/15/file/eng/Antidasavluri-ENG-web.pdf
[26]Myth Detector: The Myth About Legalization of Incest in the West is Misleading, Euro Communicator, Media Development Foundation and US Aid, 2014, http://eurocommunicator.ge/eng/view_myth/1
[27]Nations in Transit 2016: Georgia, Freedom House, 2016, https://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2016/georgia
[28]28 Michael Cecire, The Kremlin Pulls on Georgia, FP Magazine, 9 March 2015,http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/03/09/the-kremlin-pulls-on,-georgia/
[29]http://church.ge/index.php?showtopic=8865
[30]Myth Detector: Information that European Court Bans Infant Baptism is False, Euro Communicator, Media Development Foundation and US Aid, 2016, http://eurocommunicator.ge/eng/view_myth/245
